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Abstract—This paper studies the use of multi-antenna harvest-
and-jam (HJ) helpers in amulti-antenna amplify-and-forward (AF)
relay wiretap channel assuming that the direct link between the
source and destination is broken. Our objective is to maximize the
secrecy rate at the destination subject to the transmit power con-
straints of the AF relay and the HJ helpers. In the case of perfect
channel state information (CSI), the joint optimization of the artiﬁ-
cial noise (AN) covariance matrix for cooperative jamming and the
AF beamforming matrix is studied using semideﬁnite relaxation
(SDR) which is tight, while suboptimal solutions are also devised
with lower complexity. For the imperfect CSI case, we provide the
equivalent reformulation of the worst-case robust optimization to
maximize the minimum achievable secrecy rate. Inspired by the
optimal solution to the case of perfect CSI, a suboptimal robust
scheme is proposed striking a good tradeoff between complexity
and performance. Finally, numerical results for various settings
are provided to evaluate the proposed schemes.
Index Terms—Amplify-and-forward relay, artiﬁcial noise, coop-
erative jamming, harvest-and-jam, physical-layer security, robust
optimization, semideﬁnite relaxation, wireless energy transfer.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE pressing demand for high data rate in wireless com-munications networks coupled with the fact that mobile
devices are physically small and power-limited by batteries,
has driven the notion of energy harvesting (EH) to become a
promising resolution for green communications [1], [2]. Among
the varied available resources for EH, radio-frequency (RF)-en-
abled wireless energy transfer (WET) has aroused an upsurge
of interest for its long operation range, ubiquitous existence in
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the electromagnetic radiation, and effective energy multicas-
ting, which motivates the paradigm of simultaneous wireless in-
formation and power transfer (SWIPT), e.g., [3]–[6].
A typical SWIPT system consists of one access point (AP)
that has constant power supply and broadcasts wireless signals
to a group of user terminals, amongst which some intend to
decode information, referred to as information receivers (IRs),
while others scavenge energy from the ambient radio signals,
named energy receivers (ERs). This gives rise to a challenging
physical (PHY)-layer security issue where the ERs may eaves-
drop the information sent to the IRs due to their close prox-
imity to the AP To overcome this problem, in [7]–[9], several
researchers presented various approaches to guarantee secret
communication to the IRs and maximize the energy simulta-
neously transferred to the ERs or to satisfy the individual EH
requirement for the ERs and maximize the secrecy rate for the
IR, by advocating the dual use of the artiﬁcial noise (AN) or
jamming.
However, previous works all assumed that the ERs in the
SWIPT systems attempt to intercept the information for the IR,
which is overly protective. On the contrary, it is possible that
some ERs are cooperative, especially when they are EH-enabled
wirelessly. Following the recent advances in wireless powered
communications networks [10], [11], this paper proposes a self-
sustaining harvest-and-jam (HJ) relaying protocol, where in the
ﬁrst transmission phase a single-antenna transmitter transfers
conﬁdential information to a multiple-antenna amplify-and-for-
ward (AF) relay and power to a group of multi-antenna EH-en-
abled idle helpers simultaneously, while in the second phase, the
relay ampliﬁes and forwards the information to the IR under the
protection of the AN generated by the helpers using the energy
harvested from their received signals in the ﬁrst transmission
phase.
Physical (PHY)-layer security issues in the rapidly growing
cooperative networks have attracted much attention. Cooper-
ative approaches, such as, cooperative jamming, communica-
tions have been widely examined [12]–[15]. The idea is to assist
the transmitter in the secrecy transmission by generating an AN
to interfere with the eavesdropper via either multiple antennas
or external trusted helpers [16]–[19]. However, all of those
utilizing ANs require additional supply of power and therefore
incur extra system costs. Meanwhile, collaborative use of
relays to form effective beams jamming the eavesdropper,
i.e., secure collaborative relay beamforming, has been studied
for relay-wiretap channels with single eavesdropper in [20],
multiple eavesdroppers with AF relays and decode-and-for-
ward (DF) relays in [21] and [22], respectively. All, however,
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assumed the availability of perfect channel state information
(CSI). Though [23] proposed robust AF relay beamforming
against the eavesdropper's channel, the solutions were yet
suboptimal.
The assumption of perfect CSI of the eavesdroppers appears
to be too ideal because the eavesdroppers, despite being legit-
imate users, wish to hide from the transmitter without being
cooperative in the stage of channel estimation. Even if they are
registered users and bound to help the transmitter in obtaining
their CSIs to facilitate their own communication, the CSIs at the
transmitter side will change due to mobility and Doppler effect,
and may be outdated. Moreover, even for the legitimate users,
the estimated CSIs may also be subject to quantization errors
due to the limited capacity of the feedback channel, although
the inaccuracy is reasonably assumed less severe than that for
the eavesdroppers. To tackle this issue, state-of-art schemes
have been developed ([24] and the references therein), among
which the worst-case secrecy rate is commonly employed to
formulate the robust secrecy rate maximization problem [8],
[19], [25]–[27]. The robust transmit covariance design for the
secrecy rate maximization in a multiple-input-single-output
(MISO) channel overheard by multi-antenna eavesdroppers
was considered in [25], [28] while the enhanced secrecy per-
formance was achieved by introducing a friendly jammer in
the same scenario in [26], in which a joint optimization of the
robust transmit covariance and power allocation between the
source and the helper was studied via geometric programming.
More recently, [8] studied a joint robust design of the informa-
tion beams, the AN and the energy signals for SWIPT networks
with quality-of-service (QoS) constraints.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, with per-
fect CSI, in addition to the joint optimal solutions, we propose
two near-optimal schemes with much reduced complexity by
exploiting the optimal structure of the relay weight matrix, and
providing a semi-closed form solution for the relay weight ma-
trix given ﬁxed null-space jamming, respectively. Second, be-
sides the imperfect eavesdropper's channel, legitimate channels
such as those from the HJ helpers (the transmitter) to the
legitimate receiver ( HJ helpers), and from the AF relay to
the receiver are jointly modeled with imperfect estimation, and
multiple semi-indeﬁnite non-convex constraints have been ju-
diciously replaced by linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) to ﬁt
the semi-deﬁnite programming (SDP). Third, a rank-one recon-
struction algorithm exploiting the structure of the semi-deﬁnite
relaxation (SDR)-based solutions has been proposed to provide
promising performance at low computational cost.
Of particular relevance to our work is [29] which jointly op-
timizes the AF matrices and AN covariances in a relay wiretap
channel with multiple multi-antenna AF relays and multiple
multi-antenna eavesdroppers via a worst-case robust formula-
tion. While our network model is similar, the difference of our
work from [29] is twofold. On one hand, in this paper, the AN
generated by the friendly jammers are subject to their respective
channels from the transmitter during WET in the ﬁrst transmis-
sion phase. On the other hand, the technique in [29, Proposition
1] cannot be applied to our problem since the AN beams and the
forwarded information are transmitted via different channels in
ours. As a consequence, to the best of authors' knowledge, our
proposed worst-case based robust optimization scheme that in-
corporates imperfect CSIs into all the HJ helpers, has not been
addressed in the literature.
It is worth noting that devising a wireless-powered friendly
jammer to enhance PHY-layer security for a direct transmission
protocol was studied in [30], in which the “harvesting” blocks
and “jamming” blocks were well exploited to compose four dif-
ferent types of harvesting-jamming cycles. Compared to [30],
which focused on the dedicated scheduling of “harvest” and
“jam” operations and its long-term performance, ours are con-
cerned with adaptive rate/power optimization with multiple HJ
helpers to achieve higher worst-case secrecy rate. Moreover, in-
stead of assuming perfect channels to/from the HJ helpers, our
robust optimization algorithm takes imperfect legitimate chan-
nels into account to provide robustness.
Note that in this paper, as in [23], [29], we assume that the
channel between the transmitter and the AF relay is perfectly
known and there is no direct link between the transmitter and
the receiver or the eavesdropper, a common assumption in the
concerned AF relay wiretap channel [20], [21].
Notations: Throughout, we use the upper case boldface let-
ters for matrices and lower case boldface letters for vectors. The
superscripts , and represent the transpose, conju-
gate and conjugate transpose, respectively. Also, and
stand for the trace of a matrix and the statistical expectation for
random variables, respectively. Likewise, is deﬁned as a
column vector obtained by stacking the rows of on top of one
another. is the inverse operation of . de-
notes the null space of . represents the Kronecker product
of two matrices. In addition, the notation indicates that
is a positive semi-deﬁnite matrix and denotes an identity
(all-zero) matrix with appropriate size. Furthermore, rep-
resents the Euclidean norm of a vector, while stands for
the probability of an input random event. Finally, denotes
and stands for an optimal solution.
II. NETWORK MODEL
We consider a cooperative relay wiretap channel for SWIPT
over a given frequency band as shown in Fig. 1(a). We assume
that there is a transmitter, named Alice, sending conﬁdential
messages to the IR, Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper
[31], Eve, with the aid of a multi-antenna AF relay and ERs
willing to act as HJ helpers, . The
transmitter, ERs, and the AF relay are deployed in a same cluster
that is relatively far away from the destination and Eve, such
that there is no direct link from the transmitter to the receiver or
Eve, respectively. Moreover, the ERs are assumed to be located
closer to the transmitter than the AF relay in order that they can
harvest sufﬁcient amount of energy for jamming. Alice, Bob and
Eve are all assumed to be equipped with single antenna, while
the AF relay and each of the helpers are assumed to have the
same antennas.
Using two equal slots for the HJ relaying protocol, as shown
in Fig. 1(b), for the ﬁrst phase, Alice sends a conﬁdential mes-
sage to the relay while simultaneously transferring energy to
the helpers; for the second phase, the relay ampliﬁes and for-
wards the message to Bob while the helpers perform cooper-
ative jamming using their respective harvested energy from the
ﬁrst transmission phase, to compromise Eve. In this paper, we
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Fig. 1. HJ-enabled cooperative relaying for secure SWIPT.(a) AF-relaying
wiretap channel with jamming. (b) The HJ relaying protocol.
assume a quasi-static fading environment and for convenience
denote as the complex channel from the transmitter
to the relay and , , as that from the
transmitter to the th helper; as the transpose of the complex
channel from the relay to Bob and , ,
as that from to Bob; and ,
, as those from the relay and to Eve, respec-
tively.
In the ﬁrst transmission phase, the baseband received signal
at the AF relay can be expressed as
(1)
where is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
random variable, denoted by and is the addi-
tive complex noise vector, denoted by . Also,
denotes the given transmit power at Alice. Further, the re-
ceived signal at each helper is expressed as
(2)
where is the additive noise, denoted by .
On the other hand, for WET, the harvested energy of in
each unit slot is given by
(3)
where denotes the EH efﬁciency.
In the second transmission phase, the linear operation at the
AF relay can be represented by
(4)
where is the retransmit signal at the AF relay and
is the beamforming matrix. Note that the transmit
power of the AF relay can be shown as
(5)
which is constrained by the maximum available power at the AF
relay, i.e., , which is given by
(6)
In the meantime, each will help generate an AN
to interfere with Eve. Similar to [16], we assume that 's are
independent CSCG vectors denoted by , ,
since the worst-case noise for Eve is known to be Gaussian.
In addition, each has a transmit power constraint due to
its harvested energy in the previous transmission phase, i.e.,
(cf. Equation (3)), .
The received signal at Bob can thus be expressed as
(7)
where is the additive noise at Bob. Similarly,
the received signal at Eve can be expressed as
(8)
where . According to (7) and (8), the signal-
to-interference-plus-nose-ratio (SINR) at Bob and Eve can be,
respectively, expressed as
(9)
and
(10)
As such, the achievable secrecy rate at Bob is [16]
(11)
III. JOINT AN-AF BEAMFORMING WITH PERFECT CSI
A. Problem Formulation for Perfect CSI
We aim to maximize the secrecy rate at Bob subject to the
transmit power constraints at the AF relay and each individual
helper , . Thus, our problem is to solve
(12a)
(12b)
(12c)
Next, we deﬁne a new function as
(13)
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It can be easily shown that the optimal solution , to
, is also optimal for given by
(14)
Hence, we focus on solving problem in the rest of the
paper. However, since is in general a non-convex problem
that is hard to solve, we will reformulate it into a two-stage
optimization problem. First, we constrain the SINR at Eve to
be , it thus follows from (13) that is maximized
when is maximized, which can be obtained by solving the
following problem:
(15)
Let denote the optimal value of given . Then
can be equivalently solved by
(16)
Lemma 3.1: Problem has the same optimal value as
, and the same optimal solution as when takes
the optimal solution for .
Proof: The proof follows from [7, Lemmas 4.1–4.2].
Therefore, can be solved in the following two steps.
First, given any , we solve to attain ; then
we solve to obtain the optimal .
B. Optimal Solution to
Here, we consider solving problem by jointly op-
timizing the covariance matrix for the AN at each of the HJ
helper, 's, and the beamforming matrix, . To facilitate the
analysis in the sequel, we rewrite the following equations in line
with our deﬁnition of [32, Chapter 13]:
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
In addition, , where
with . Hence, can be
rewritten as
(21a)
(21b)
in which , , ,
and .
As problem is non-convex, we deﬁne
, , , ,
and . Then by ignoring the rank-one
constraint on , is modiﬁed as
(22a)
(22b)
(22c)
(22d)
Problem , via Charnes-Cooper transfor-
mation [33], can be equivalently recast as
(23a)
(23b)
(23c)
(23d)
(23e)
Lemma 3.2: The constraints in (23a) and (23b) can be
replaced by and
,
respectively, where both inequalities will be activated when
problem obtains its optimum value.
Proof: See [34, Appendix A].
Since problem is a standard convex op-
timization problem and satisﬁes the Slater's condition, its gap
with its dual problem is zero [35]. Now, let denote the dual
variable associated with the equality constraint in (23a), asso-
ciated with the other equality constraint in (23b), associated
with the transmit power constraint for the AF relay in (23c),
associated with the transmit power constraints for each
in (23d), and associated with . Then the Lagrangian of
problem is given by
(24)
where denotes the set of all primal and dual variables,
(25)
(26)
(27)
6620 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SIGNAL PROCESSING, VOL. 63, NO. 24, DECEMBER 15, 2015
TABLE I
ALGORITHM I FOR
Proposition 3.1: The optimal solution, , to
satisﬁes the following conditions:
1) if ,if , ;
2) can be expressed as
(28)
where , , (cf. Equa-
tion (88)) and is a vector orthogonal to
Ξ , which consists of orthonormal basis for
;
3) According to (28), if , then we have the
following sufﬁcient condition to yield an optimal solution
of with rank-one:
(29)
(30)
(31)
is also optimal to problem , if there ex-
ists such that
(32)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note from Proposition 3.1 that if , then the
optimal to can be found directly from the
eigenvalue decomposition (EVD) of , where .
Namely, the upper-bound optimum value obtained by
solving is tight in this case; otherwise,
only serves as an upper-bound solution.
Now, we show that this upper-bound is always achievable
by a rank-one . When , ﬁrstly, we check
whether the sufﬁcient condition proposed in (32) is satisﬁed.
If it is met, then a direct reconstruction of with
follows according to (29)–(31); otherwise, as-
sume that any optimal solution to problem
has no zero component, i.e., . In
addition, the number of optimization variables and the number
of shaping constraints are denoted by and , respectively.
Since and for , we
have satisﬁed. Thus, according to [36, Proposition
3.5], has an optimal solution of that is
rank-one. Also, the detailed rank reduction procedure based on
an arbitrary-rank solution has been given in [36, Algorithm 1].
Algorithm I for solving is shown in Table I.
C. Suboptimal Solutions to
1) Optimal Solution Structure Based Scheme: We propose
a relay beamforming design for based on the optimal
structure of [37, Theorem 3.1]. First, deﬁne
and . Then express the truncated singular-value
decomposition (SVD) of and , respectively, as
(33)
(34)
Lemma 3.3: The optimal relay beamforming matrix for
problem is of the form:
(35)
where and are two unknown ma-
trices, and , satisfy
, , respectively.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Denote , , by , , , respectively.
We thus simplify and as and
, respectively. Since has complex vari-
ables, we devise a suboptimal design for to reduce the size of
variables by . Speciﬁcally, let , where
such that . Hence, ,
and (5) can be reduced to ,
and , respec-
tively. Then deﬁne , ,
, , , and
with ; , , ,
, , , and .
The suboptimal design for problem by ignoring the rank
constraints on and is thus given by
(36a)
(36b)
(36c)
(36d)
(36e)
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Remark 3.1: The variables in , i.e.,
, , are of much reduced size. Fur-
ther, the reconstruction of from can be brieﬂy explained as
follows. Given the Lagrangian of , the KKT
conditions with respect to (w.r.t.) are given by
(37)
(38)
Post-multiplying (37) with , we have
. As a result, if , ;
otherwise , with , where
is an arbitrary vector with unit norm. With
solved, reduces to a problem with similar
structure as , and the proof for existence of a
rank-one can be referred to Proposition 3.1.
2) Zero-forcing: We propose a low-complexity ZF scheme
for , in which the jamming signal places a null at
Bob, and then a semi-closed form solution for is de-
rived. In line with the principle of ZF jamming [17], the
jamming signal is designed as such that
, and is an arbitrary
random vector, , . Thus, given
any , 's can be optimized to maximize the effect of jam-
ming at Eve by , which gives
, where , and
is determined by (23d), . As such,
turns out to be , which is denoted by .
With ﬁxed , can be recast as
(39a)
(39b)
(39c)
(39d)
Proposition 3.2: must yield a rank-one
solution, i.e., , such that , and
(40)
where represents the eigenvector corresponding
to the largest eigenvalue of the associated matrix, and
. Also, , and are the op-
timal dual variables associated with (39a)–(39c), respectively.
Proof: See Appendix C.
The only problem in Proposition 3.2 is the dual problem of
, which admits a much simpler structure to
solve than the primal one.
IV. JOINT AN-AF BEAMFORMING WITH IMPERFECT CSI
A. Problem Formulation for Imperfect CSI
We use a deterministic spherical model [25], [26] to charac-
terize the resulting CSIs' uncertainties such that
(41a)
(41b)
(41c)
(41d)
(41e)
where , 's, , 's and 's are the estimates of the
corresponding channels; , 's, , 's and 's
are their respective channel errors; the matrices , 's,
, 's and 's determine the shape of each error region.
Without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.), we set ,
, , and for
simplicity, where , , , , and represent the respective
size of the bounded error regions, .
Accordingly, we denote the robust counterpart for as
(42a)
(42b)
(42c)
An equivalent robust reformulation of is given by
(43)
where and denotes the optimal value of
problem that is given by
(44a)
(44b)
(44c)
(44d)
(44e)
As stated in Lemma 3.1, similarly, can be proved to have
the same optimal value as and the same optimal solution
as when takes its optimal value. As a result, can
be solved in a two-stage fashion as well. Speciﬁcally, given any
, we ﬁrst solve to obtain and then search for
the optimal to .
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B. Solutions to
By ignoring (44d), is recast as
(45a)
It is worth noting that due to the rank-one relax-
ation of , solution provided by
in general yields an upper-bound for
, which may not be achievable. However, in the sequel
we insist on solving that is regarded as
an upper-bound benchmark for our proposed problem detailed
later in this subsection.
1) Solutions to : To make the “max-
min” objective function of (45) tractable, we ﬁrst rewrite (45)
by the equivalent epigraph formulation as
(46a)
(46b)
As there are potentially inﬁnite number of constraints in (46a),
(44a), and (44c), they are semi-indeﬁnite and thus intractable.
In the following, we equivalently transform these constraints to
tractable ones using S-Procedure and a generalized S-Procedure
given in Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
Lemma 4.1 (S-Procedure [35]): Let , be
deﬁned as
(47)
where , and , and
gives the real part of the input entity. Then the implication
holds if and only if there exists
such that
(48)
provided there exists a point such that , .
Lemma 4.2 ([38, Theorem 3.5]): The robust block quadratic
matrix inequality (QMI),
(49)
is equivalent to
(50)
First, by rearranging terms, (46a) can be equivalently trans-
formed into the following linear form:
(51)
Recalling the following matrix equalities in line with our deﬁ-
nition of operation:
(52)
(53)
(54)
it follows that
(55)
(56)
where . The equivalent channel
model for is given by , where
(cf. Equation (41)). By introducing
and , (51) can thus be recast as
(57)
Hence, according to Lemma 4.1, the implication
(57) holds if and only if there exists such
that the following LMI holds:
(58)
where ,
and
. Now, (46a) has been equivalently reformulated as
(58). To further cope with channel uncertainties with regards to
's such that (58) holds for , , we need
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1: The semi-indeﬁnite constraint of (57) can
be equivalently recast as the following block matrix inequality:
(59)
where , and are recursively given by
;
,
(60)
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;
,
(61)
,
. In addition, ,
, , , and
denote pertinent auxiliary variables.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Next, (44a) is rewritten as
(62)
where and the equivalent imperfect
channel model is given by such that .
Proposition 4.2: The semi-indeﬁnite constraint of (62) is sat-
isﬁed if and only if there exists , , such
that the following block matrix inequality holds:
(63)
where , and are recursively given by
;
,
(64)
;
,
(65)
(66)
. Also, , , and
, .
Proof: See Appendix E.
Last, we rewrite (44c) to facilitate the robust optimization
against the errors introduced by 's. By applying Lemma 4.1,
(44c) holds if and only if there exists , ,
such that the following LMI constraint is met:
(67)
As such, is now simpliﬁed as
Because of the non-convex term such as in (59), problem
remains very hard to solve. We thus use
the bisection method [35] w.r.t. to solve it. However, using bi-
section in addition to solving by one-dimension search
over may lead to very high complexity. As a result, we pro-
pose an alternative problem to approximate .
2) Solutions to : We propose to approxi-
mate by the optimum value of the following problem.
(68a)
(68b)
(68c)
(68d)
(68e)
(68f)
Remark 4.1: It is worth noting that as the numerator and the
denominator of the objective function in are coupled
by common uncertainty , Charnes-Cooper transformation, in
general, cannot be applied to realize equivalent decoupling. As
a result, yields a more conservative approxi-
mation for than . However, con-
sidering that needs to be solved only once
for given in contrast with requring
isection over , we exploit it in the sequel. The effectiveness of
this approximation will be evaluated in Section V-B.
To proceed, we rewrite as
(69a)
(69b)
First, by rewriting , where , in line
with Lemma 4.1, the implication (69a)
holds if and only if there exists such that the following
LMI constraint is satisﬁed:
(70)
Next, as (cf. Equation (56)), where
, after some manipulation, (68b) holds if and
only if there exists such that
(71)
where
. Then (68b) can be rewritten as
(72)
which is handled by the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.3: The semi-indeﬁnite constraints in (72) can
be replaced by the following LMI constraint:
(73)
where and are recursively given by
(74)
where , , ,
, , and denote
the auxiliary variables.
Proof: See Appendix F.
Proposition 4.4: The constraint in (68c) is guaranteed if and
only if there exists , , such that the fol-
lowing LMI holds:
(75)
where and are recursively given by
(76)
in which , , ,
,
, and denote the auxiliary variables.
Proof: It is observed that (68c) differs from (44a) in the
only respect that is replaced by . Hence the proof for
Proposition 4.2 can be directly applied herein by substituting
for .
Last, by replacing “ ” in (44c) with “ ” in (68e), (68e)
can be replaced by a similar LMI as (67), denoted by , in
which the pertinent auxiliary variables are denoted by
.
Consequently, the equivalent reformulation for problem
can be summarized as
(77a)
(77b)
C. Proposed Rank-One Solutions to
is convex and can be solved efﬁciently by
convex optimization tools such as CVX. Next, we derive the
Lagrangian of . Note that in the following ex-
pression, we only consider the uncertainties regarding , 's,
's, and 's when for the purpose of simplicity and
the results can be easily extended to the case of . Denote
the dual variables associated with (68d), (70), (73) and (75) by
, , and , respectively. Then the partial Lagrangian of
w.r.t. is
(78)
where is the set of all primal and dual variables, and
(79)
In (79), ; , , ,
and , are the block submatrices of
, and
with the same size as block
submatrices in (70), (73) and (75), respectively. Moreover,
in (79), , ,
and . Furthermore, , and
are the th block diagonal submatrices of ,
and , respectively;
and are the th block diagonal submatrices of
, and , respectively.
Proposition 4.5:
1) The optimal to is expressed as
(80)
where , , , and is a unit-norm
vector orthogonal to Ξ (cf. Equation (28)).
2) According to (80), if , i.e., there exists at
least one , we reconstruct a solution to problem
using
(81)
(82)
(83)
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TABLE II
ALGORITHM II FOR
while are obtained by solving the following feasi-
bility problem provided that , , and are given by
(81), (82) and (83), respectively:
Proof: See Appendix G.
The scheme that solves is summarized in Table II.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here we provide numerical examples to validate our results.
We assume a typical scenario where the helpers are evenly
distributed around Alice with a radius of and
(radian by default), where is the angle of direc-
tion (w.r.t. the Alice-relay link by default) of the th helper,
. Alice, Bob and Eve are, w.l.o.g., assumed to
have the same distance away from the AF relay with their angle
of direction , and , respectively. We also assume
channel models with both large-scale fading, i.e., path loss and
shadowing, and small-scale fading, i.e., multi-path fading. The
simpliﬁed large-scale fading model is given by [39]
(84)
where is a log-normal random variable capturing the effect
of shadowing with the standard derivation ,
, is the distance, is a reference distance set to be 1
m, and is the path loss exponent. Speciﬁcally, the chan-
nels including 's, , and , are assumed to suffer from
Rician fading while the channels from the HJ helpers to Bob
( 's) and Eve ( 's) follow Rayleigh distribution due to the
missing of line-of-sight (LOS) components with their respec-
tive average gain speciﬁed by (84). Take , , as an example,
, where is the LOS compo-
nent with (cf. Equation (84)), is the Rayleigh
Fig. 2. Secrecy rate versus Alice's transmit power with perfect CSI.
fading component denoted by , and is
the Rician factor set to be 3. Note that for the involved LOS
component, we use the far-ﬁeld uniform linear antenna array to
model the channels [40]. In addition, unless otherwise speciﬁed,
the number of HJ helpers, is set to be 5; the AF relay is as-
sumed to be 5 m away from Alice; the EH efﬁciency,
and . The results presented in
Section V-A are obtained by averaging over 500 times of inde-
pendent trials.
A. The Perfect CSI Case
We compare the proposed optimal solutions with three
suboptimal schemes in the case of perfect CSI. One sub-
optimal scheme, denoted by “Suboptimal 1”, is introduced
in Section III-C1 by exploiting the optimal structure of .
The other described in Section III-C2 is known as optimal
null-space ZF, denoted by “Suboptimal 2”. Speciﬁcally, each
jamming beam is restricted to lie in the orthogonal space
of such that 's cause no interference to the IR while
maximizing its effect of jamming at the eavesdropper. As a
benchmark, we also present the well-known isotropic jamming
that is particularly useful when there is no Eve's CSI known at
each HJ helper, , [41], denoted by “Suboptimal 3”. Note
that the difference between “Suboptimal 2” and “Suboptimal 3”
only lies in the design of jamming noise, for which the former
also aligns the jamming noise to an equivalent Eve's channel to
confront Eve with most interference, while the latter transmits
isotropic jamming with ,
, in directions orthogonal to 's, due to lack
of knowledge of Eve's channel and thus is expected to be less
efﬁcient than “Suboptimal 2” with perfect CSI.
First, we study the secrecy rate at the receiver versus the
transmit power of the transmitter, with .
Fig. 2 demonstrates that for both cases of and ,
the average secrecy rate increases and tends to be saturated as
goes to 30 dBm. It also illustrates that “suboptimal 1” and “sub-
optimal 2” closely approach the optimal solutions while “Sub-
optimal 3” is outperformed more succinctly with larger number
of antennas at the AF relay and the HJ helpers. Moreover, with
increasing, the average secrecy rate gets larger as a result of
the higher array gain of the AF relay and more available power
transferred to the HJ helpers.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rate versus the relay's transmit power with perfect CSI.
In addition, we show in Fig. 3 the secrecy rate achieved by
different schemes versus the transmit power of the AF relay,
with . It is seen that the average secrecy rate ﬁrst
grows faster and then slower, since when increases, not only
the desired signal but also the noise yielded from the ﬁrst trans-
mission phase is ampliﬁed to a larger extent. In addition, the
performance gap between the optimal scheme and suboptimal
schemes is almost negligible. Similar to Fig. 2, “Suboptimal 3”
appears to have certain performance loss from the optimality
but is considered as a promising scheme when no Eve's CSI is
available at the HJ helpers.
B. The Imperfect CSI Case
Now, we consider the imperfect CSI case and compare
the proposed scheme Robust SDR with HJ, which is ob-
tained by solving , against some
benchmarks. Note that there are two upper-bound bench-
mark schemes, namely, Robust SDR with HJ and Robust-eqv
with HJ, as well as two lower-bound benchmarks, which are
Robust w/o HJ and Non-robust with HJ. For Robust SDR
with HJ (Robust-eqv with HJ), given any , is ap-
proximated by solving the rank constraint relaxed problem
. On the other
hand, for Robust w/o HJ, we solve by setting
, while for Non-robust with HJ, (11) is evaluated
by applying the optimal solutions to assuming perfect
CSI, to the actual channels including errors that are generated
from the sets deﬁned in (41).
To assess the worst-case secrecy performance, we use the
metric, namely, secrecy outage probability, deﬁned as [42]:
(85)
where obtained by solving is termed as the -
secrecy outage rate.
The parameters are set identical to those in the perfect CSI
case. Regarding the uncertainty model in (41), we introduce the
uncertainty ratios associated with , , , and as , ,
, and , respectively. For instance, is
(86)
while , 's, 's and 's are similarly deﬁned and thus
omitted here for brevity. Besides, it is reasonable to assume that
Fig. 4. CDFs of the achievable secrecy rate.
Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability for and helpers, respec-
tively.
the channel estimates w.r.t Eve suffer from more errors than
those for Alice and Bob. Hence, we set
while , , unless otherwise
speciﬁed.
Fig. 4 demonstrates the cumulative density function
(CDF) of the achievable secrecy rate from 1000 samples of
random channel errors uniformly distributed over the sets
deﬁned by (41) given ﬁxed actual channel realization. We
set , , , and
, . Despite being
suboptimal to the upper-bound schemes of “Robust SDR with
HJ” and “Robust-eqv with HJ”, the proposed “Robust with HJ”
scheme outperforms its non-robust counterpart “Non-robust
with HJ” particularly in the low range of probability, and
overwhelmingly surpasses the “Robust w/o HJ”. For example,
“Robust with HJ” can achieve a secrecy rate of around 3.5
bps/Hz in the 3% worst case versus that of 3.3 bps/Hz and 1.0
bps/Hz for the “Non-robust with HJ” and “Robust w/o HJ”,
respectively. The solutions for “Robust SDR with HJ” is also
seen to admit very little gap from those for “Robust-eqv with
HJ”, which suggests that approximating by solving the
complexity reduced “Robust SDR with HJ” leads almost no
performance loss.
Fig. 5 illustrates the CDF of the achievable secrecy rate from
1000 samples of random channel errors generated in the same
way as Fig. 4, with , and
. It is observed that proposed solutions to “Robust with HJ”
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Fig. 6. Secrecy outage rate versus the normalized channel errors.
nearly achieve their upper-bound rank constraint relaxed solu-
tions, i.e., SDR, to “Robust upper SDR with HJ” throughout
the whole range of outage probability. Moreover, the “Robust
w/o HJ” yields the worst performance. In particular, when the
outage probability falls to 3%, the “Robust w/o HJ” achieves a
worst-case secrecy rate of less than 1 bps/Hz while the proposed
scheme can still guarantee an outage rate of rough 1.64 bps/Hz
and 2.07 bps/Hz for and , respectively. Also, it
is observed that increasing the number of HJ helpers will im-
prove the secrecy performance, but we do not draw conclusions
on the extent to which the secrecy rate can increase, since it also
depends on the level of channel estimation inaccuracy. For ex-
ample, more HJ helpers may also yield larger interference to the
legitimate receiver if the channels from HJ helpers to Bob are
not as well estimated as this instance of , . Hence
we suggest that in practice, a mild number of HJ helpers are
sufﬁcient in view of the trade-off between complexity and per-
formance.
Fig. 6 shows two different levels ( and )
of secrecy outage rate versus the channel uncertainty ratios (as-
suming , ), in which ,
, and . It is observed that the
secrecy outage rate by the proposed schemes decreases slowly
with the eavesdropper's CSI error ratios, which validates the
motivation of the worst-case robust optimization. It is worth
noting that the advantage of the HJ protocol is more signiﬁ-
cant when the normalized channel uncertainty of Eve's chan-
nels surpasses 10%, since the HJ scheme provides more degree
of freedom for robust design and thus capable of guaranteeing
larger worst-case secrecy rate against worse channel conditions
compared to that withoutHJ. The reasonably suboptimal perfor-
mance of the proposed “Robust with HJ” is also seen as from
Figs. 4 and 5.
Fig. 7 studies the 100 p%-secrecy outage rate for
and , respectively, versus the transmit power of the AF
relay. Speciﬁcally, we set , , and .
As observed similarly from Fig. 6, the robust schemes with
the assistance of HJ helpers perform considerably better than
solutions without HJ helpers. Furthermore, when the transmit
power is set relatively large, i.e., , it is seen
that continuously increasing does not contribute much to
the secrecy performance, because in this situation the increased
ampliﬁed noise at the AF relay compromises the performance,
Fig. 7. Secrecy outage rate versus the relay's transmit power.
which provides useful insight for practical setting of . In addi-
tion, the proposed “Robust with HJ” is observed striking a good
trade-off between optimality and complexity compared with the
two upper-bound solutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper considered improving the secret wireless com-
munications in a multi-antenna AF relay wiretap channel via
a novel harvest-and-jam (HJ) relaying protocol. The AN co-
variance matrices at HJ helpers and the AF relay beamforming
matrix have been jointly optimized to maximize the achiev-
able secrecy rate and/or worst-case secrecy rate at the legiti-
mate receiver subject to the transmit power constraints of the
AF relay as well as the HJ helpers, on perfect and imperfect
CSI occasions, respectively, using the technique of semi-deﬁ-
nite relaxation (SDR). The SDR was shown tight for the perfect
CSI case while suboptimal rank-one reconstruction algorithms
for the robust formulation under imperfect CSIs were presented
achieving promising tradeoffs between complexity and perfor-
mance. The effectiveness of the proposed schemes were also
veriﬁed by numerical results.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 3.1
The KKT conditions of are given by
(87a)
(87b)
(87c)
According to (26), if for certain , , then
and thus
, which yields as a result
of (87b). Otherwise, when , we will have
[7,
Lemma A.1], which implies . However,
cannot be 0, since otherwise
and thus according to (87c), which contradicts to
. Hence, when , .
Next, deﬁne
and according to (25), we have
(88)
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Then deﬁne , Ξ and , (cf. Equation
(28)). Similar to the approach used in [7, Appendix B], we dis-
cuss the structure of the optimal under two cases.
1) Case I: . As is full-rank,
and hence . If
, and it fol-
lows that by assuming as the only basis
of . Otherwise, according to (87a), we obtain
, which ceases the secrecy transmission and cannot
be the optimal solution to .
2) Case II: . If is not full-rank,
. Then by pre-multiplying and post-multiplying
Ξ with both sides of (88), we have
(89)
According to (24), it is necessary for to obtain an
optimal solution of and therefore , which
conforms to if and only if and
. Hence, Ξ , i.e.,
. Next, we show
by contradiction. If , Ξ ,
and . However, in this case, since
, , which is apparently not
optimal. Hence, we have and thus
. This indicates that be-
sides the basis in Ξ, spans over an extra dimen-
sion of basis, which is denoted by , and hence
.
Assume that is the optimal solution to
with . Then construct a new
solution according to (29)–(31). Now, we check
if the reconstructed solution is feasible if (32) holds. First,
(90)
Moreover,
(91)
In addition, (23c)–(23e) are easily shown to satisfy. In the
above, and hold due to the feasibility in (23a) and (23b),
respectively. Further, shows that
the reconstructed solution achieves the same optimum value
as that of . Hence, an optimal solution to
with rank-one is ensured.
B. Proof of Lemma 3.3
First, we construct as
(92)
where , , and
are undetermined matrices. Then according to
(33) and (34), it follows that
and . Sim-
ilarly, we also have and
. Thus, (cf. Equa-
tion (9)) and (cf. Equation (10)) do not depend on and .
Next, by substituting (92) for in (5), we have
. Since is a secrecy rate maximization
problem subject to the given , it turns out that given the
optimum secrecy rate, is the minimized required power by
taking and , while and cannot be determined
directly. Thus, .
C. Proof of Proposition 3.2
Denoting the dual variable associated with (39a), (39b)
and (39c) by , and , respectively, the Lagrangian of
is expressed as
(93)
where denotes the set consisting of all the
primal and dual variables. Since problem
satisﬁes the Slater condition, its optimum value admits zero du-
ality gap with its dual counterpart. Furthermore, according to
(93), in order for the dual function to be bounded from above,
the following constraints must hold:
(94)
(95)
The dual problem is therefore given by
(96a)
(96b)
It is observed that is of the same form as the Hessian
matrix with respect to without rank relaxation. According
to [43, Theorem 2.1], implies that the SDR problem
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is tight in this case, i.e., such that
. Moreover, since KKT condition necessitates
, it follows that is the eigenvector corresponds to
the zero-eigenvalue of . Hence, we have ,
where is due to the power
constraint of (23c), which completes the proof.
D. Proof of Proposition 4.1
First, given , , ﬁxed, only consider the uncer-
tainty of . Since , we have
. By applying Lemma 4.2 to (58) with
, , ,
, , and , there
exists such that the following LMI holds:
(97)
Note that for , there always exists such that
and we assume that such constraint is ap-
plied. According to the property of Schur-Complements [35, A.
5.5], for (97), we have
(98)
which can be reexpressed as
(99)
Next, assume that the robust design for (58) has been consid-
ered against the precedent uncertainties, i.e.,
(100)
Applying a similar procedure as that for (97), (100) can be
recast as
(101)
Then given , ﬁxed, accommodate the
uncertainty, i.e., , for (101). By applying Lemma 4.2
to the uncertainty of , the implication (101)
holds if and only if there exists such that
(102)
where
(103)
,
and , . Thus, using the
method of mathematical induction, (58) holds for ,
, if and only if there exists , such that
(59) is satisﬁed, which completes the proof.
E. Proof of Proposition 4.2
Taking the similar procedure as that for dealing with (57), the
implication (62) holds if and only if there
exists such that the following LMI holds:
(104)
where ,
and
. Equation
(44a) has been equivalently reformulated into (104). Then,
given , , ﬁxed, applying similar procedure to
that in Appendix D, it follows that there exists such
that the following LMI holds:
(105)
Since always holds, (105) is equivalent to
the following LMI:
(106)
Next, devising the method of mathematical induction again as
that for (99), (104) holds for , , if and only if there
exists , such that (63) is satisﬁed, which completes
the proof.
F. Proof of Proposition 4.3
We only sketch the proof herein since it is quite similar to that
of Proposition 4.1. First, apply Lemma 4.2 to (71) given 's,
, ﬁxed and obtain an initial LMI. Next, manipulate
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the resulting LMI according to the property of Schur-Comple-
ments to facilitate using Lemma 4.2. Then, repeat this procedure
until all the semi-indeﬁnite constraints w.r.t. 's have been in-
corporated into an equivalent LMI.
G. Proof of Proposition 4.5
According to the KKT conditions of , we
have , where is given by (79). Deﬁne
with denoted by . Then take the
similar procedure as Case I and Case II in Appendix A, it can
be obtained that .
Next, we prove the second half of Proposition 4.5. According
to (81),
(107)
and thus (69a) holds true, which implies that the same op-
timal value as , i.e., , is achievable.
However, since the constraint in (68c) is ignored, the global
optimal for via solving is
probably violated in . For example,
, which re-
sults in the actual objective value for , smaller
than , and thus suboptimal for .
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